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Abstract 
This paper investigates how increases in the level of maximum earnings subject to the Social 
Security payroll tax have affected Social Security benefits and taxes. The analysis uses data from 
the Health and Retirement Study to ask how different the present value of own benefits and taxes 
would be for the cohort born from 1948 to 1953 (ages 51 to 56 in 2004) if they faced the lower 
cap on the payroll tax that faced those born 12 and 24 years earlier, but otherwise had the same 
earnings stream and faced the same benefit formula. We find that for those in the Early Boomer 
cohort of the Health and Retirement Study, ages 51 to 56 in 2004, that after adjusting for 
nominal wage growth, benefits were increased by 1.5 percent by the increase in the payroll tax 
ceiling compared to the cohort 12 years older, and by 3.7 percent over the benefits under the 
payroll tax ceiling for the cohort 24 years older. Tax receipts were increased by 5.3 and 10.6 
percent over tax receipts that would have been collected under the tax ceilings that applied to the 
cohorts 12 and 24 years older respectively. About 22 percent of the additional tax revenues 
created by the increase in the payroll tax cap between the Early Boomer cohort and those 12 
years older led to increased benefits. Similarly, about 27 percent of the additional tax revenues 
created by the increase in the payroll tax cap between the Early Boomer cohort and those 24 
years older led to increase benefits. 
 
Results are also presented separately for men and women, for those in the top quartile of earners, 
and for those at the tax ceiling throughout their work lives. 
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When considering how to narrow the funding gap facing Social Security, policy makers 
continue to consider the option of raising the maximum salary subject to the payroll tax (U.S. 
Senate, Special Committee on Aging, 2010). In this paper we attempt to improve our 
understanding of how changes in the maximum level of earnings subject to the payroll tax have 
affected Social Security taxes and benefits. We use data from the Health and Retirement Study to 
separate the changes in taxes and benefits resulting from changes in the cap on income subject to 
payroll taxes from the effects of other complex changes that have occurred contemporaneously 
with the rise in the cap. Our strategy is to ask what benefits and taxes would have been for 
members of the HRS cohort ages 51 to 56 in 2004 if they faced the same maximum income 
subject to the payroll tax that applied to members of cohorts who were 12 and 24 years older. 
An increase in maximum covered earnings has an immediate effect on payroll tax 
revenues. But unlike an across the board increase in the payroll tax rate, an increase in maximum 
covered earnings restricts the tax increase to those with highest earnings. It has no effect on 
many workers, raising tax costs only for those with earnings at or above the new effective cap.  
In addition, as opposed to an increase in the payroll tax rate, raising the tax ceiling 
creates a leak in the (future) finances of the system in the form of an increase in future 
obligations to be paid to those at the top of the earnings distribution. Those who have earnings 
above the old cap have more of their total lifetime earnings covered by Social Security when the 
cap is increased. As a result, they are entitled to higher benefits. Although one could increase the 
cap on covered earnings without raising Social Security benefits, some are loathe to do this 
because it violates the insurance principle underlying Social Security. In keeping with the 
redistributive motivation of Social Security, for those at the cap benefits rise by only 15 percent 
of the increase in covered earnings.  
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From 1951 through 2004, maximum taxable earnings increased from $3,600 to $87,900, 
an increase of 24.4 times. Over the same period average annual covered earnings increased from 
$2,799 to $35,649, an increase of 12.7 times.2
Our empirical analysis takes as an earnings baseline the covered earnings for the 
youngest cohort thus far included in the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), the Early Boomer 
Cohort.
 Thus the rate of increase in maximum taxable 
earnings has been about twice the rate of increase of average earnings 
3 We use these data to study how increases in maximum taxable earnings have affected 
the benefits of members of this cohort relative to members of cohorts that are 12 and 24 years 
older. We estimate how the benefits of the younger cohort would have changed had they faced 
the lower ceiling on taxable earnings that faced members of the original HRS cohort, who are 12 
years older, and the ceiling for the CODA (Children of the Depression) cohort, who are 12 years 
older than that.4
                                                 
 2 There is a small element of simultaneity here as part of the increase in average covered 
earnings is the result of the increase in the earnings cap. 
 In making our calculations, all we change is the ceiling on earnings subject the 
payroll tax that was in place when the person was of a particular age. Otherwise we risk 
confounding our findings with the effects of other contemporaneous changes that have also 
 3 The HRS survey was in the field as of the writing of this paper. It is now collecting data 
for a new cohort, the Mid Boomers, who are ages 51 to 56 in 2010. 
 4 In calculating benefits we hold earnings history constant at the level observed for the 
Early Boomer cohort, and use the benefit formula in place in 2004. Benefits for the Early 
Boomer cohort are based on Average Indexed Monthly Earnings (AIME), computed from 
covered earnings, increased by a wage index up to the year the individual turns age 60. The 
AIME is averaged over the highest 35 years of covered, indexed earnings. Earnings after age 60 
will enter into the AIME calculation if they exceed indexed earnings in the lowest of the 35 years 
previously counted toward the AIME. From Average Indexed Covered (Monthly) Earnings, the 
Primary Insurance Amount (PIA) is calculated. For a person turning age 60 in 2004, the PIA 
replaced 90 percent of the first $612 in monthly earnings, 32 percent of the next $3,077, and 15 
percent of the amount above $3,689. This same formula is applied to the same earnings history 
for each member of the HRS cohort, but the level of maximum covered earnings is changed 
when the simulation pertains to those born 12 and 24 years earlier. 
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affected benefits. For example, members of the Early Boomer cohort had a higher normal 
retirement age than did members of the HRS cohort. At least in this respect, the benefit formula 
applicable to the HRS cohort was more generous than the benefit formula for Early Boomers.  
Our analysis utilizes Social Security earnings records for those HRS respondents who 
gave explicit permission to allow their earnings records to be matched to the basic survey 
instrument, while imputing benefits for those without a matched earnings record.5
To determine how changes in the earnings cap have affected the distribution of benefits, 
and in particular how these changes have affected those in the top of the earnings distribution, 
 Social 
Security benefits are calculated from data on yearly covered earnings using the Social Security 
Administration's ANYPIA program. In analyzing the effect of changes in the Social Security 
earnings cap, we ask how benefits would have changed (for the cohort of Early Boomers, those 
ages 51 to 56 in 2004) if the maximum taxable earnings that applied to the HRS cohort of 51 to 
56 year olds instead had applied to the Early Boomer cohort. To simulate the effects of a lower 
ceiling on covered earnings for members of older cohorts, while holding all other factors 
constant, we artificially truncate the level of (real) earnings inserted into the ANYPIA program 
by the earnings cap that applied 12 or 24 years earlier, adjusting for differences in average 
earnings over the period. Using this methodology, we simulate the effects of the increase in the 
payroll tax ceiling as experienced between the cohorts aged 51 to 56 in 2004 and in 1992 and 
between those 51 to 56 in 2004 vs.1980. 
                                                 
5 In the past two years, Social Security benefits have provided an important buffer to the 
decline in the stock market. In part because of the dominating presence of Social Security, the 
recent decline in the stock market reduced total retirement wealth by about 5 percentage points 
for the population approaching retirement age (Gustman, Steinmeier and Tabatabai, 2010). The 
cushion provided by Social Security is especially important for those in the lower half of the 
income and wealth distributions, the usual targets of social policy. But those in the lower half of 




we examine the changes in benefits for those falling in different earnings quartiles, focusing a 
good deal of our attention on those falling in the highest earnings quartile.  
Section II of the paper discusses the cap on earnings subject to the payroll tax and 
describes more fully how that cap has changed over time. Section III uses HRS data for the Early 
Boomer cohort to summarize changes in monthly Social Security benefits due to the change in 
the maximum level of covered earnings between the Early Boomer cohort and those in a cohort 
12 years older, and then compared to a cohort 24 years older. In Section IV we examine the 
effects on both benefits and taxes of increases in the ceiling on taxable earnings for those with 
earnings at or above the earnings cap throughout their lifetimes. Section V uses HRS data to 
investigate the effects of changes in the earnings cap on the present values of benefits and taxes 
over the lifetime of members of the Early Boomer cohort, while Section VI discusses the 
implications of our findings. 
II. Maximum taxable earnings subject to the payroll tax 
From 1937 to 1949, annual maximum earnings subject to the payroll tax was $3,000. 
Once the real value of the $3,000 cap was eroded by rising earnings, the share of total earnings 
covered by Social Security began to decline, and continued down for decades. A reversal in 
policy was implemented in the mid 1970s and the cap climbed relative to average earnings, 
before stabilizing in the 1980s.  
Suppose we are dealing with a member of the original HRS cohort who was 56 in 1992 
and who worked on a long term job until age 60 in 1996. For simplicity, this individual’s yearly 
earnings always increased over his lifetime, and earnings from 1961 are the lowest of his annual 
earnings counted when computing AIME (Average Indexed Monthly Earnings). In 1961, the cap 
on yearly earnings subject to the payroll tax was $4,800, about 17 percent greater than average 
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annual earnings in private employment for that year. Roughly speaking, any earnings above 
average earnings were not subject to the payroll tax and would not generate future benefits. Now 
consider a person who was 56 in 2004, leaving a long term job in 2008 at age 60, with earnings 
from 1973 the lowest earnings counting toward AIME. In 1973, earnings up to $10,800 were 
covered by Social Security and subject to a payroll tax. Since earnings in the private sector 
averaged about $7,580, earnings up to 42 percent above the average level were taxed and 
generated benefits. Of course, many of those with relatively low earnings were not affected by 
the increase in maximum covered earnings, but many with moderate or high earnings found their 
AIME increased by the application of a higher ceiling. 
Any change in the earnings cap over time should be adjusted for changes in average 
earnings over time. To make that adjustment, we use the calculated wage growth used to index 
for earnings growth in the AIME calculation. Members of the Early Boomer cohort, born from 
1948 to 1953, would have reached age 25 between 1973 and 1978. Members of the original HRS 
cohort, born from 1936 to 1941, reached age 25 between 1961 and 1966. After indexing, $4,800, 
the earnings cap for those age 25 in 1961, amounts to  $8,880 12 years later.6
                                                 
 6 As noted above, the cap on covered earnings does have an effect on average covered 
earnings. When the cap is increased, that raises average earnings. Thus the simple adjustment for 
indexing used here overstates the adjustment that should be applied to the cap in earnings from 
the earlier year. Of course, most of the increase in average earnings is due to the increase in 
wages observed as a result of productivity growth, changes in the underlying wage structure and 
inflation, with modification due to the changing mix in employment in favor of more women, 
whose wages still fall below those of men. 
 Thus over the 12 
year period from 1961 to 1973, the real cap on earnings increased by 21.6 percent 
(10,800/8,880). Similarly, adjusting the $6,600 cap on earnings in 1966 by the index applicable 
over the next 12 years increases the real cap to $14,124. Comparing the actual ceiling in 1978 
with the ceiling from 1966 after adjusting by the wage index, the cap on maximum covered 
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earnings is 25.3 percent (17,700/14,124) higher in 1978 than in 1966. Thus the real earnings cap 
is higher for members of younger cohorts.  
Now consider in more detail how the cap on taxable earnings has changed over time 
relative to the average annual wage covered by Social Security. Table 1 reports these data for the 
period 1951 through 2004. As can be seen, over time policy makers have increased maximum 
covered earnings more rapidly than the increase in average earnings. For the decades of the 
1950s and 1960s, the maximum level of earnings subject to the payroll tax was a bit greater than 
the average wage.7
Roughly speaking, if members of the Early Boomer cohort, ages 51 to 56 in 2004, had 
earnings between ages 25 and 60 count as their high 35 years of earnings, for those in the middle 
of this cohort, covered earnings between 1975 and 2010 would count toward their AIME. Thus 
for this cohort, counted earnings would not include earnings from the period with a very low cap, 
where the ratio of the cap to average earnings was between 1 and 1.5. Almost all the earnings 
counted in determining their AIME would have been within periods after 1983, when there was a 
high cap on covered earnings and a ratio of the cap to average earnings of 2.3 to 2.55. (We treat 
the period after 2004 as if the relation between the earnings cap and average earnings remains 
within this range.) 
 The ratios of maximum taxable earnings to average annual wages ranged 
between 1.0 and 1.4. It was in the early and mid 1970s that the cap on taxable earnings began to 
rise much more rapidly than the average wage. By 1983, the ratio of maximum earnings to 
average covered wage roughly stabilized, and has since varied between 2.3 and 2.55.   
                                                 
7 In the early years of Social Security, maximum taxable earnings exceeded the earnings of 
almost all workers. Ninety seven percent of all workers in 1937 and 1940 had earnings below the 
taxable maximum. By 1945, 86 percent of workers had earnings below the maximum. (Source: 
Social Security Bulletin, 2007, Table 4.B4) 
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For those ages 51 to 56 in 1992, included as part of the original HRS cohort, earnings 
from roughly 1963 to 1998 count in determining their AIME. Compared to the Early Boomer 
cohort, that adds in a period of 12 years from 1963 to 1975. During this period, the earnings cap 
was low, with a ratio of the earnings cap to average earnings ranging from 1.03 to 1.64. At the 
same time, compared to the Early Boomer cohort, earnings over a period of 12 years from 1998 
to 2010 would no longer count. During this period, the ratio of the cap to average earnings was 
high, ranging from 2.37 to 2.55.   
The difference in the earnings cap between the Early Boomer cohort and the CODA 
(Children of the Depression) Cohort is even wider. Consider members of the CODA cohort born 
from 1924 to 1929, ages 51 to 56 in 1980. 1951 is approximately the first year of earnings to be 
included in their AIME calculation. From 1951 to 1963, the ratio of maximum covered earnings 
to the average wage ranges from 1.09 to 1.29. Removing the period from 1986 to 1998, the last 
years counted in determining the AIME for member of the HRS cohort, eliminates a 12 year 
























1951 3600 2799 1.29 1978 17700 10556 1.68 
1952 3600 2973 1.21 1979 22900 11479 1.99 
1953 3600 3139 1.15 1980 25900 12513 2.07 
1954 3600 3156 1.14 1981 29700 13773 2.16 
1955 4200 3301 1.27 1982 32400 14531 2.23 
1956 4200 3532 1.19 1983 35700 15239 2.34 
1957 4200 3642 1.15 1984 37800 16135 2.34 
1958 4200 3674 1.14 1985 39600 16823 2.35 
1959 4800 3856 1.24 1986 42000 17322 2.42 
1960 4800 4007 1.20 1987 43800 18427 2.38 
1961 4800 4087 1.17 1988 45000 19334 2.33 
1962 4800 4291 1.12 1989 48000 20100 2.39 
1963 4800 4397 1.09 1990 51300 21028 2.44 
1964 4800 4576 1.05 1991 53400 21812 2.45 
1965 4800 4659 1.03 1992 55500 22935 2.42 
1966 6600 4938 1.34 1993 57600 23133 2.49 
1967 6600 5213 1.27 1994 60600 23754 2.55 
1968 7800 5572 1.40 1995 61200 24706 2.48 
1969 7800 5894 1.32 1996 62700 25914 2.42 
1970 7800 6186 1.26 1997 65400 27426 2.38 
1971 7800 6497 1.20 1998 68400 28861 2.37 
1972 9000 7134 1.26 1999 72600 30470 2.38 
1973 10800 7580 1.42 2000 76200 32155 2.37 
1974 13200 8031 1.64 2001 80400 32922 2.44 
1975 14100 8631 1.63 2002 84900 33252 2.55 
1976 15300 9226 1.66 2003 87000 34065 2.55 
1977 16500 9779 1.69 2004 87900 35649 2.47 
Source: Social Security Bulletin (2007) Table 2.A8. From 1937 to 1950, maximum 




Table 2: Percentage of Workers with Earnings Below Annual Maximum Taxable 
Year All Workers Year All Workers 
 Total Men Women  Total Men Women 
1937 96.9 95.8 99.7 1976 85.1 76.3 97.5 
1940 96.6 95.4 99.7 1977 85.2 76.3 97.5 
1945 86.3 78.6 98.9 1978 84.6 75.4 97.1 
1950 71.1 59.9 94.6 1979 90.0 83.6 98.6 
1951 75.5 64.6 96.7 1980 91.2 85.5 98.8 
1952 72.1 60.0 95.4 1981 92.4 87.4 99.0 
1953 68.8 55.5 93.8 1982 92.9 88.3 98.9 
1954 68.4 55.4 93.0 1983 93.7 89.6 99.0 
1955 74.4 63.4 95.9 1984 93.6 89.4 98.9 
1956 71.6 59.7 94.5 1985 93.5 89.3 98.8 
1957 70.1 58.7 93.1 1986 93.8 89.7 98.7 
1958 69.4 58.4 91.8 1987 93.9 89.9 98.6 
1959 73.3 62.7 94.3 1988 93.5 89.4 98.3 
1960 72.0 60.9 93.5 1989 93.8 90.1 98.3 
1961 70.8 59.6 92.4 1990 94.3 90.9 98.4 
1962 68.8 57.1 91.1 1991 94.4 91.1 98.3 
1963 67.5 55.5 90.0 1992 94.3 91.0 98.1 
1964 65.5 53.1 88.5 1993 94.4 91.3 98.1 
1965 63.9 51.0 87.3 1994 94.6 91.4 98.1 
1966 75.8 64.4 95.6 1995 94.2 91.0 97.9 
1967 73.6 61.5 94.2 1996 93.9 90.6 97.7 
1968 78.6 68.0 96.3 1997 93.8 90.5 97.6 
1969 75.5 62.8 96.0 1998 93.7 90.3 97.5 
1970 74.0 61.8 93.5 1999 93.9 90.7 97.5 
1971 71.7 59.1 91.7 2000 93.8 90.6 97.4 
1972 75.0 62.9 93.9 2001 94.1 91.0 97.5 
1973 79.7 68.9 96.2 2002 94.6 91.8 97.7 
1974 84.9 76.2 97.8 2003 94.5 91.8 97.5 
1975 84.9 76.4 97.5 2004 94.1 91.2 97.2 
Source: Annual Statistical Supplement, Table 4.B.4. 
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Having considered how maximum taxable earnings related to average earnings, consider 
how the fraction of workers whose total earnings were above and below the annual taxable 
maximum has changed over time. Table 2 reports the share of the population with earnings 
below the taxable earnings cap. In 1937, 96.9 percent of workers had earnings below the cap, so 
that only 3.1 percent of workers had earnings above the cap. After rising, and reaching a third of 
workers in the 1960s, the fraction with earnings above the cap began to fall. By 1979, only 10 
percent of earners had earnings above the cap. In the following years the cap rose to the point 
where only 5 or 6 percent of workers had earnings above the cap. From these data, we also see 
that male workers are more likely than female workers to have earnings above the cap. In 1950, 
about 40 percent of male workers and about 5 percent of female workers had earnings above the 
maximum taxable level. By 2004, 8.8 percent of men and 2.8 percent of women had earnings 
above the cap.  
III. Measuring the Effects on Monthly Benefits of Changes in the Social Security Earnings 
Cap 
To isolate the effects on benefits of changes in the cap on earnings subject to the Social 
Security payroll tax, the most straight-forward approach is to begin with a single cohort. We 
choose the Early Boomer cohort of the Health and Retirement Study, ages 51 to 56 in 2004. We 
then use the Social Security Administration's ANYPIA program to calculate monthly benefits for 
this cohort. Next we impose lower earnings caps that would apply to cohorts 12 and 24 years 
older. This procedure leaves earnings and the benefit formula unchanged. Benefits can then be 
calculated under the lower earnings cap and compared with benefits under the actual earnings 
cap each individual faced, while holding all other factors influencing benefits the same.  
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Consider first the calculation of monthly benefits for those in the Early Boomer cohort, 
ages 51 to 56 in 2004. We use the Social Security earnings histories matched for members of the 
Early Boomer cohort, together with projections of earnings, and then compute their Social 
Security benefits. (As discussed below, earnings records are imputed for those who do not have a 
matched earnings record.) 
Then to simulate the effects of the lower maximum on taxable earnings facing those from 
older cohorts, we simply truncate the earnings stream submitted to the ANYPIA program. For 
example, for covered earnings in 2004, a first calculation would use covered earnings up to the 
actual maximum taxable earnings in place in 2004, $87,900. If an HRS respondent had higher 
earnings than $87,900, the effect of the cap on covered earnings is to reduce the earnings 
submitted to the benefit calculation to the amount of the cap. When simulating the effects of the 
lower (nominal) cap facing those born 12 years earlier, we would take the actual earnings in 
2004 observed for the members of the Early Boomer cohort, but subject them to the cap on 
covered earnings that applied in 1992. The cap that would have applied to members of the older 
cohort was $55,500. Similarly, the cap that would have faced a member of the Early Boomer 
cohort 24 years earlier (than 2004) was $25,900.  
The next step is to adjust the nominal cap from 12 years earlier for the growth in wages 
between 1992 and 2004. We use the data from Table 1 to calculate the growth in average wage, 
multiplying the nominal cap in place 12 years earlier by the growth in the average annual wage 
over the 12 year period. A cap from the 1980s adjusted for the change in average annual wages 
does not differ much from the cap that applied 12 years later. But once the lower caps in place in 

































































































































* AIME is average indexed monthly earnings. PIA is primary insurance amount. 
** The number of observations with either a matched or imputed earnings record who are insured is 2,476. There are 1,116 males, and 
1,360 females. 
*** Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
Note: Quarters of coverage are reported in the Social Security record. After 2005, when earnings are projected, quarters of coverage 




One other adjustment we make is to impute benefits for those without a matched Social 
Security earnings history. We use a nearest neighbor approach. A regression is run for those who 
have a matched earnings record, where the Primary Insurance Amount computed from the 
earnings record is the dependent variable. Independent variables are taken from the respondent 
reports to the HRS.8
From Table 3, row 1, columns 1 and 5, Average Indexed Monthly Earnings are increased 
by about 3.7 percent (2825/2724) when the payroll tax cap that applied to the Early Boomer 
cohort is used instead of the cap that applied to the HRS cohort, whose members were 12 years 
older. Given the progressivity of the benefit formula, the primary insurance amount is only 1.6 
(1432/1410) percent greater when the cap from 2004 (row 1, column 2) is used instead of the 
adjusted cap that applied to the 1992 cohort (row 1, column 6). For men, the difference in AIME 
is 5.6 percent (3378/3200), wider than the difference for women of 1.7 percent (2372/2333). As 
expected, women are much less likely to have earnings near the cap, and thus are much less 
likely to be affected by an increase in the cap. The corresponding effects on benefits of raising 
the earnings cap between the HRS and Early Boomer cohorts are 2.4 percent (1606/1568) for 
men, and 0.7 percent (1289/1280) for women. 
 The nearest neighbor is then selected on the basis of the predicted PIA, 
including in the sample both those with and without matched earnings records. We then replace 
the missing record with the entire Social Security record of the donor and treat the observation 
for which a value was imputed as if the earnings record had never been missing. 
                                                 
8 Covariates used in imputing earnings records are taken from respondent reports to the HRS. 
They include annual earnings from current job, household income from last calendar year, 
demographic characteristics, indicators of marital status and history, age, work history, including 
reported work in each HRS wave, tenure on longest and current job, total number of years 
worked, number of jobs, number of jobs worked five or more years, industry and occupation 
from current job, union membership, whether public employee, if U.S. born, home ownership, 
number of children, if the individual is insured for benefits at normal retirement age, labor force 
and disability status, self employment status in 2004, and veteran's status. 
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The last two columns of Table 3 make the analogous calculations regarding the increase 
in the real earnings cap over 24 years, essentially comparing the effects of the real caps in place 
for members of the Early Boomer cohort, 51 to 56 in 2004, with the real caps for members of the 
Children of the Depression (CODA) cohort, 51 to 56 in 1980.  Over the entire population, the 
difference in benefits generated by raising the maximum level of earnings subject to the payroll 
tax is a much more substantial 3.8 (1432/1380) percent. For men, there is a 5.4 percent 
(1606/1524) increase in benefits from raising the earnings cap between the Early Boomer and 
CODA cohorts. For women, the difference is 2.2 percent (1289/1261). 
Table 4 presents the analogous results after sorting the population by AIME quartile. 
Tables 5 and 6 present the same results by AIME quartile separately for men and women. 
15 
 










































































































































































































































































































































































































































We focus on columns 7 and 9 of each of these tables. From the first row of Table 4, 
columns 7 and 9, for those in the bottom quartile of the AIME distribution, there is no effect on 
the Primary Insurance Amount from raising the cap between the HRS and either the Early 
Boomer or Children of the Depression cohorts. Benefits are increased by 0 and 1 percent for 
those in the second quartile, and 1 and 2 percent for those in the third quartile. As expected, there 
are much larger effects from changing the caps for those in the fourth AIME quartile, bottom 
row of Table 4. If those in the upper quartile of the AIME distribution in 2004 were subject to 
the real caps imposed on those 12 years older, their primary insurance amount would be roughly 
3 percent lower. Imposing the real cap on earnings that would have obtained for a cohort 51 to 
56 in 1980 increases the benefits of those in the fourth AIME quartile by 8 percent. 
Comparing Tables 5 with 6, the effects of raising the caps are much larger for men than 
for women. For example, comparing those in the top quartile of men and women, focusing on the 
change created by raising the cap from the level that applied to those 51 to 56 in 1992 to the cap 
from 2004, benefits for men increase by 4 percent, while women's benefits increase only by 1 
percent (bottom row, column 7 of each table). Focusing on the difference in the caps that applied 
to those in the Early Boomer and CODA cohorts, the increase in the cap from 1980 to 2004 
increases benefits for men in the top quartile by 10 percent, while increasing the benefits of 
women in the top quartile by 4 percent.  
 
IV. Effects of Changes in Maximum Earnings Subject to the Payroll Tax on Taxes and 
Benefits for Those Whose Earnings Are at or Above the Maximum. 
Next we would like to see how past increases in maximum earnings subject to the payroll 
tax affected the present values of both tax and benefit streams for those with maximum earnings. 
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For purposes of example, we begin by examining the effects of changes in the earnings 
maximum over time for a man from the Early Boomer cohort who represents a person with 
maximum covered earnings. This man was born in 1948 and survived at least to age 56 in 2004. 
He began working in 1969 at age 21, and if he survived until 2009, stopped working after 2009 
at age 61. He will claim benefits at age 66 in 2014. We first assume that each year's earnings are 
at the maximum covered by the payroll tax throughout his work history. Thus from Table 1, in 
2004 his earnings are $87,900; in 2003 they are $87,000, etc.  
Two things should be noted about the tax rates we use. First we use the sum of the OASI 
and DI tax rates paid by respondents and their employers. Because we do not include disability 
payments as part of benefits, (in our work below with HRS data, we do not model participation 
in the DI program), this means we are going to overstate the value of taxes relative to benefits. 
Second, the tax rates have been changing over time. Thus the payroll tax rates paid in earlier 
years of work differ from those charged later on. (See Social Security Administration, 2007, 
Table 2.A3).9
Next we impose the caps on earnings that would have applied had this individual been 12 
years older, born in 1936. However, while the cap is determined as if he were born 12 years 
earlier, his actual earnings are taken to be those described above, equal to the caps experienced 
throughout his working life for a person born in 1948. Thus in 2004 his earnings are $87,900, but 
the payroll tax is capped at the level from 12 years earlier, in 1992, so that only $55,500 of those 
earnings are subject to the payroll tax. In 2003, of his $87,000 in earnings, $53,400, the earnings 
cap in 1991, is subject to the payroll tax. We then adjust the earnings caps from the remaining 
years as if he were born 12 years earlier.  
 
                                                 
9 Note we hold the tax rates constant between cohorts, allowing only the ceiling on taxable 
earnings to change from one cohort to the next. 
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The earnings caps are stated in nominal terms. To adjust the caps from 12 years earlier to 
real terms, once again caps on earnings from 12 years earlier are increased by the growth in 
wages. For example, the growth in wages is 55.4 percent (35,649/22,935) between 1992 and 
2004; and 56.2 percent (34,065/21,812) between 1991 and 2003, and so on.  
Once we complete the analysis of the effect of imposing the earnings caps that would 
have applied to a man 12 years older, we repeat the calculation for an individual who is 24 years 
older. Thus we impose the caps that would have applied to a person born in 1924, but otherwise 
leave earnings at the level of the caps that applied to a person born in 1948, and keep all other 
factors the same.  
The first thing to notice in Table 7 is how poor a deal Social Security is for a person with 
earnings at or above the cap. The present value of the basic benefit in 2004 is $226,462, while 
the present value of taxes paid is $521,581. As we know, the benefit formula is designed to 
redistribute benefits among those with different levels of earnings. The replacement rates 
specified by the formula determining Social Security benefits in 2004 decline from 90 percent of 
the first $7,344 of annual earnings, to 32 percent of the next $36,924, down to 15 percent of any 
remaining earnings through the covered maximum. Nevertheless, the relation between benefits 
and taxes is better than indicated in the table. There are two reasons for this. First, the deal faced 
by our representative individual would be greatly improved by counting spouse and survivor 
benefits, which are more important for those with higher earnings (Gustman and Steinmeier, 
2001). Second, as noted previously, the tax rate we use includes taxes to support disability 
insurance, but we do not count disability benefits in our benefit calculation.  
Nevertheless, increasing the earnings cap does raise benefits and taxes. The remainder of 
the data in Table 7 tells us just how much benefits and taxes were increased for this high earner 
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as the ceiling on covered earnings was raised to the level that applied to a person born in 1948 
from a person born in 1936, 12 years earlier, and then to a person born in 1924, 24 years earlier. 
After adjusting the cap in real terms, from columns 1 and 3, the present value of benefits increase 
due to the increase in the payroll tax cap over the 12 years from $207,301 to $226,462, or 9.2 
percent. The present value of payroll taxes paid increase much more, from $412,054 to 
$521,581, or by 26.6 percent. Comparing columns 1 and 5, which report comparable figures over 
24 years, the present value of benefits increase due to the increase in the cap on earnings subject 
to the payroll tax from $198,340 to $226,462, or 14.2 percent. The present value of payroll taxes 
paid increase from $385,638 to $521,581, or by 35.2 percent.  
A number of interest for policy is the leakage in benefits created by the increase in the 
payroll tax cap. This number indicates the share of the tax increase that is used to support higher 
benefits. Comparing first the Early Boomer and HRS cohorts, the change in the present value of 
benefits divided by the change in the present value of taxes from raising the ceiling on the 
payroll tax amounts to about 17 percent, as reported in column 7 of Table 7. Between the CODA 
and Early Boomer cohorts, from the last column in the table, the change in the present value of 
benefits divided by the change in the present value of taxes from raising the ceiling on the 
payroll tax, after adjusting the change in the caps for changes in the wage, amounts to about 21 
percent.  
 Thus our example suggests that for a person earning at the maximum level covered by 
Social Security, about a fifth of the additional taxes collected due to the increase in the earnings 
cap are used to pay for increased benefits, reducing the incremental funds available for 
addressing the Social Security revenue shortfall by about a fifth. When we use HRS data, the 
share of increased taxes that leaks back in the form of additional benefits will be slightly higher. 
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Table 7: Estimates of Present Values of Social Security Benefits and Taxes with 2004, 1992 and 1980 Caps for an Individual with Maximum 

























































































1- Uses real interest rate when computing discounted present value of benefits as of normal retirement age.  
2- Uses nominal interest rate when discounting that benefit from normal retirement age to 2004. 
3- Uses nominal interest rate for calculating the present value of taxes paid up to 2004.  
4- Uses nominal interest rate for discounting taxes paid after 2004 back to 2004.  




V. Effects of Changes in Maximum Earnings Subject to the Payroll Tax on Benefits and 
Taxes for the Early Boomer Cohort 
Now we turn to the data from the HRS and apply those data as we did in Section III, here 
accounting for the effects of changes in the ceiling on covered earnings on both benefits and 
taxes. Our baseline is the Early Boomer cohort. In examining the effect of changes in the ceiling 
on taxable earnings, we once again ask how benefits and taxes would change if we change only 
the maximum earnings subject to the payroll tax, holding earnings and other aspects of the tax 
and benefit rules, such as the payroll tax rate, constant between the Early Boomer cohort and 
older cohorts.10
Table 8 follows the format of the tables in the previous section. Comparing the effects of 
the earnings caps that applied to the Early Boomer cohort and the HRS cohort 12 years older, we 
see from columns 1 and 3 that the present value of benefits is increased by 1.5 percent 
(120,991/119,190) due to the higher cap applying to the members of the early boomer cohort. 
Taxes are increased by 5.3 percent (162,692/154,570). So the increase in benefits from the higher 




                                                 
 10 Once again, we  apply a tax rate that includes the portion used to support DI benefits, 
while not adding disability payments to the benefit side. One might try to adjust benefits by 
simply eliminating those who receive DI benefits from the sample. This would require a deeper 
analysis of DI benefit determination than we undertake here. For one thing, the sample includes 
those ages 51 to 56. A number of these individuals will become eligible for disability benefits 
before they reach normal retirement age, but without a full model of disability determination, we 
cannot identify which ones they are. For another, once they become eligible for normal 





Table 8: Estimates of Present Values of Social Security Benefits and Taxes with 2004, 1992 and 1980 Caps For All Individuals, 
























































































Note: Respondents who are insured for benefits at normal retirement age are included. Number of observations is 2,475. The sample 
includes respondents with matched Social Security records. Records are imputed for those with missing records. Social Security benefits are 
the present value of benefits at normal retirement age discounted to 2004 dollars. Social Security taxes are present value of taxes paid up to 







Comparable figures for the differences created by the caps experienced by the Early 
Boomer and Children of the Depression cohort, in columns 5 and 1, suggest that the effect of the 
increase in the payroll tax ceiling over 24 years was to raise benefits by 3.7 percent 
(120,991/116,730), while raising taxes by 10.6 percent (162,692/147,055). Thus the leakage 
from taxes to benefits amounted to 27 percent [(120,991 - 116,730)/(162,692 - 147,055)] of the 
increase in taxes received. 
The Appendix contains four tables that decompose the benefit and tax changes first 
between men and women (Table 9), then by quartile (Table 10). As expected, these tables show 
that the changes in benefits and taxes were concentrated, but not exclusively located, in the top 
quartiles, and were much larger for men than for women. Tables 11 and 12, further disaggregate 
the results, focusing on the distributions within quartiles of men and women, and the changes in 
benefits and taxes within quartile, by gender. 
There are two basic findings from these results. First, as expected, most of the increases 
in taxes and benefits are concentrated in the men who fall in the top quartile of earners. As seen 
in Table 11, bottom row, their taxes are increased by 12.6 percent (406,893/361,456) over the 
taxes of those in a cohort 12 years older, and by 26.4 percent (406,896/321,863) relative to the 
taxes of those who are 24 years older. The comparable increases for their benefits, shown in row 
7, are 3.9 percent (196,633/189,273) and 10.2 percent (196,633/178,393). Overall, the ratio of 
the increase in benefits to the increase in taxes for men falling in the top quartile of earners is 16 
percent and 21 percent compared to those in cohorts 12 and 24 years older.  
Increases in the ceiling on covered earnings also affects the taxes and benefits of men in 
the third quartile, but the effect is much smaller than it is for members of the top quartile of 
earners. For example, for men in the fourth quartile, taxes increase by almost $90,000 due to the 
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increase in the payroll tax ceiling, while for members of the third quartile, taxes increase by only 
$13,000.  
Similarly, benefits and taxes reported in Table 12 are seen to be increased for women in 
the top quartile of female earners as a result of the increase in the ceiling on earnings covered by 
the payroll tax. But the taxes paid by women in the top quartile increase by only $27,000 
(278,876 - 251,896) as a result of the increase in the payroll tax ceiling over 24 years. 
 
VI. Conclusions:  
This paper has analyzed how changes in the level of maximum earnings subject to the 
Social Security payroll tax have affected Social Security benefits and taxes paid. For those in the 
Early Boomer cohort of the Health and Retirement Study, ages 51 to 56 in 2004, benefits 
increased by 1.5 percent due to the increase in the real payroll tax ceiling compared to the cohort 
12 years older, and by 3.7 percent compared to the cohort 24 years older. Tax receipts increased 
by 5.3 and 10.3 percent over tax receipts that would have been collected under the tax ceilings 
that applied to the cohorts 12 and 24 years older respectively. Thus about 22 percent of the 
additional tax revenues created by increasing the payroll tax cap between the Early Boomer 
cohort and those 12 years older is used to increase benefits. Similarly, about 27 percent of the 
additional tax revenues created by the increase in the payroll tax cap between the Early Boomer 
cohort and those 24 years older is used to increase benefits.  
There are two important differences between the effect of raising a given amount of tax 
dollars by increasing the payroll tax rate, as compared to increasing the maximum earnings 
subject to the payroll tax. First, because increasing the maximum income subject to the payroll 
tax increases both tax revenues and benefit payments, an increase in the ceiling on income 
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subject to the payroll tax that generates the same addition to taxes as does an increase in the 
payroll tax rate, nevertheless generates less net revenue. Second, since both the tax increase and 
benefit increase from raising the ceiling on earnings subject to the payroll tax applies only to 
those in the top income brackets, distributional differences result in both tax payments by 
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Table 9: Estimates of Present Values of Social Security Benefits and Taxes at Normal Retirement Age with Caps for 2004, 1992 and 1980 
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Table 10: Averages of Present Values of Social Security Benefits and Taxes at Normal Retirement Age by AIME Quartiles for 


























































First Quartile          
            Benefits 54,539 
 










             Taxes 37,446 
 
35,457 37,334 29,385 37,342 
Second Quartile          
            Benefits 94,473 
 










             Taxes 92,503 
 
80,785 91,322 58,718 91,329 
Third Quartile          
            Benefits 136,231 
 










             Taxes 173,704 
 
143,159 170,479 86,488 168,336 
Fourth Quartile          
            Benefits 198,873 
 










             Taxes 347,267 
 
222,489 319,406 102,564 291,475 
*Ratios of differences only reported when both tax and benefit changes exceed $1,000.  
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Table 11: Average Present Value Social Security Benefits and Taxes at Normal Retirement Age by AIME Quartiles for Males Ages 51-56 in 




















































First Quartile          








               Taxes 52,865 
 
48,271 52,523 36,972 52,596 
Second Quartile          
               Benefits 95,525 
 








               Taxes 120,777 
 
98,146 117,610 66,157 117,399 
Third Quartile          
               Benefits 140,958 
 








               Taxes 226,354 
 
170,322 217,697 95,436 212,986 
Fourth Quartile          
               Benefits 196,633 
 










                Taxes 406,893 
 
236,748 361,456 106,577 321,863 
*Ratios of differences only reported when both tax and benefit change exceed $1,000. 
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    Table 12: Average Present Values of Social Security Benefits and Taxes at Normal Retirement Age by AIME Quartiles for Females Ages 




















































First Quartile          








               Taxes 30,791 
 
29,503 30,661 25,872 30,683 
Second Quartile          
               Benefits 93,172 
 








               Taxes 72,860 
 
66,745 72,415 51,395 72,179 
Third Quartile          
               Benefits 131,427 
 








               Taxes 141,250 
 
124,423 140,076 80,516 138,958 
Fourth Quartile          
               Benefits 204,036 
 










                Taxes 278,876 
 
203,019 268,826 96,728 251,896 
*Ratios of differences are only reported when both tax and benefit changes exceed $1,000. 
